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A Developed Understanding of the Beneficiary’s Interest in Commercial Trusts 
through a Comparative Study of Chinese Law 
 
Ruiqiao Zhang* 
ABSTRACT 
Trusts have existed for centuries, while societies and economies have developed in the 
intervening years. This requires renovations, or new judicial interpretations, of the trust in order 
to adapt it to modern circumstances. Based a comparative study of Chinese trust law and a 
discussion about the theoretical basis for the research – the new role of trusts in a commercial 
context and the essence of the trust – the author provides a developed understanding of the 
beneficiary’s interest to adjust the traditional trust notions to meet the demands of commercial 
practices. She argues that a beneficiary’s right can be explained as a special personal claim 
consisting of three parts: the main claim (personal claims), appurtenant rights (rights of 
supervision), and security rights (rights of revocation). The theory of beneficiary’s special 
personal claim provides a more unified and comprehensive understanding of the nature of the 
beneficiary’s interest, in particularly in newly developed commercial trusts.  
 
Keywords: trust law, comparative law, the nature of a beneficiary’s interest, law and finance, 
rule of law  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The trust, originally used in common law to protect family landholdings over generations, has 
developed into a vehicle that is not only adopted as a guardian of family property, but also for 
entrepreneurial and commercial uses. The new role that the trust plays in financial markets has 
also spurred the introduction of trusts into civilian jurisdictions, including China. This evolved 
role of trusts invites scholars to rethink some fundamental concepts and theories of the 
traditional common law trust, such as the ownership of trust property, the essence of the trust, 
and the nature of the beneficiary’s right. 
     This article seeks to provide a developed understanding of the beneficiary's interest through 
a comparative study of Chinese law. In particular, this helps to respond to the evolved role of 
trusts for commercial use and the consequence of the introduction of trusts in civil law. As one 
of the world trade centres, and one of the first socialist and civil law jurisdictions to introduce 
a domestic law of trusts, China’s legislation and practice of trusts has important research 
significance. Because of the trust’s advantages in investment, banking, and financing, China 
took the bold step of introducing its own domestic trust law in 2001. The Chinese trust is mainly 
in the form of commercial trust. 
     To provide a developed understanding of the beneficiary’s interests, particularly in a 
commercial setting, and to explain how or where the case study of Chinese law sheds light on 
the re-examination of traditional theories of trust, this article is divided into three parts and 
makes comparisons between the Chinese trust and the common law trust mainly as found in 
England and Wales. The first part examines the new role of trusts in the commercial context, 
which is also the context in which the trust is mainly applied in China. Part two critically 
analyses the essence of the trust, i.e. which aspects of trust law relating to property and 
obligations are essential to the trust. After discussing these issues as the theoretical basis for 
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the research, the final part provides a developed understanding of the beneficiary’s interest – a 
special personal claim. The author employs interdisciplinary, theoretical, comparative, and 
reformist methodologies. 
 
A NEW ROLE FOR TRUSTS TO PLAY IN THE COMMERCIAL CONTEXT  
⎯ AN EXAMPLE OF THE NOTION OF THE TRUST IN CHINA 
 
The origin of trusts can be traced back to the thirteenth century, when it was used to protect 
family assets. The trust was essentially a conveyancing device for the holding of land to avoid 
financial liability and restrictions on the inheritance of property.1 In the modern world however, 
it has also developed into and is more often used as a valuable device for commercial business 
in various forms, including investment vehicles, pensions trusts, securitization trusts and many 
others.2 The trust is of particular use in the international financial markets. It permits the legal 
relationship between persons and assets to remain secure and flexible at the same time, with 
property or priority rights relating to a changing pool of assets being enjoyed by a changing 
class of persons and being subject to concurrent interests and/or enforcement restrictions.3 In 
financial terms, the most important role a trust plays in today’s world is related to the holding 
of incorporeal wealth.4.  
 
1 See S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London: Butterworths, 2nd ed, 1981) ch 9; J. 
H. Baker, An Intodution to English Legal History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) ch 14. 
2 See R. Zhang, “The new role trusts play in modern financial markets: the evolution of trusts from guardian to 
entrepreneur and the reasons for the evolution” (2017) 23:4 Trusts & Trustees 453 at 456-458. 
3 D. Hayton, H. Pigott, and J. Benjamin, “The Use of Trusts In International Financial Transactions” (2002) 1 
JIBFL 23 at 29. 
4  M. Graziadei, U. Mattei and L. Smith, eds. Commercial Trusts in European Private Law, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 27, n 74: See R. H. Sitkoff, ‘An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law’, 89 
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     The use of trusts in commercial applications5 has promoted the introduction of trusts into 
civilian jurisdictions. With the development of international trade, the civilian jurisdictions, 
whether pure or mixed, were anxious to improve their opportunity to collaborate with or even 
compete with common law jurisdictions. Trusts no longer exist only in common law systems.6 
In fact, both the United Nations7 and the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
(HCCH)8 have attempted to introduce the trust to civilian jurisdictions and respond to the 
evolution of trusts in the commercial context. This international trend makes the case study of 
Chinese trusts – an example of trusts in civil law and for commercial uses – of great 
comparation interest in analysing what are the differences between traditional trusts and 
commercial trusts, and how can the traditional trust notion be adjusted to meet the demands of 
commercial practice. 
     The notion of trust in China has evolved differently from traditional common law’s 
conception of trust. It has mainly been used for commercial applications. The traditional trust 
 
Cornell L. Rev. (2004). 
5 The trust, in this evolved form, is described as a ‘commercial trust’ in this article, referring to express trusts 
engaging in commercial activity. It is not a legal term of art or a category of trust in the traditional taxonomy. 
6 P. Panico, International Trust Laws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2017) 1. 
7 See Unidroit, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, UPL 1957, Paper XL, Trust – Document 
1, ‘Report on Possible Uses of Certain Principles of the Trust in Civil Law Countries’; UPL 1958, Paper XL, 
Trust – Document 2, ‘Memorandum Concerning the Introduction of Some Principles of Trust into the Civil 
Law Legislations’. 
8 In 1984, the delegates of some twenty-six member countries of the Hague Conference met in their fifteenth 
session and discussed the fashioning of a Convention to recognise the trust. As a product of the conference, the 
implementation of the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (concluded 
1 July 1985, entered into force 1 January 1992) was published. 
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that used to manage inter-generational property never took root in feudal dynastic China. 
Inheritance was predominantly regulated by customary law, and there was little room for 
testamentary disposition by individuals. The history of trusts in China only started from 1911, 
when dynastic rule ended and the Chinese Nationalist Party took control of the country. Trusts 
were set up as trust administration departments within banks, governmental trust institutions, 
and trust companies – a type of trust was broadly adopted at that time and still exists as a major 
use of trust in China.9  
     With the growth of private wealth in China, from 1979 to 1988, the number of trust and 
investment companies rose up to more than one thousand. 10  This period also saw the 
introduction of a new form of commercial trust, the collective capital trust, only operable by 
trust companies. 11  However, due to the lack of legal requirements for the segregation of 
investor and trustee funds, whatever profits or losses accrued went to the trust and investment 
companies rather than to the customers. 12 To correct the inappropriate promotion of trust 
companies and to regulate trust business, the Chinese government implemented a series of 
‘rectifications’ between 1988 and 1998 in which trust institutions were separated from banks.13 
 
9 The trust came to a halt after the Communist takeover in 1949, and obtained a new lease of life in 1979 when 
China adopted an open-door policy for foreign trade and investment. 
10 J. Tang and R. Chao, Financial Trust and Financial Market (Tianjin: Tianjin science and Technic Press, 1990) 
29 [translated by author]. 
11 L. Ho, R. Lee and J. Jin, ‘Trust Law in China: a critical evaluation of its conceptual foundation’ in L. Ho and 
R. Lee (eds), Trust Law in Asian Civil Law Jurisdictions: A Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 80, 80. 
12 L. Ho, ‘Trust laws in China: History, ambiguity and beneficiary’s rights’ in L. Smith (ed), Re-imagining the 
Trust: Trusts in Civil Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 183, 188-189. 
13 D. Su, ‘Trusts and Taxes’ (2006) 11 Times Finance 7, 7 [translated by author]. 
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A further culling of companies with payment difficulties, insufficient assets, or poor 
management, reduced the number of trust and investment companies to fifty-eight.14  
     The experience of those rectifications became one of the primary reasons for drafting the 
Trust Law of People’s Republic of China15 (Trust Law of China), which makes China one of 
the first socialist, civil law jurisdictions to have introduced a domestic law of trusts. This Trust 
Law has attracted much attention, both in China and overseas.16  
      When the Trust Law of China was drafted, it mainly provided for commercial trusts, and 
thus contains some unique regulations compared with its common law counterpart. Professor 
Jiang Ping, the Trust Law of China’s main drafter, considered it an innovation of the Chinese 
law to leave open the issue of the location of ownership.17 Instead of adopting the term of 
‘transfer’, the Chinese law chooses the expression of ‘entrusting’ (委托) the property to 
describe the relationship between a settlor and a trustee. Article 2 of the Trust Law of China 
 
14 J. Guan, Trust Law & Practice in China (Beijing: Law Press China, 2008) 11-12 [translated by author]. 
15 Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Twenty-First Session of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress, promulgated by Order No. 50 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 28 
April 2001, and effective as of 1 October 2001). Before the Trust Law of China, the Chinese trust was regulated 
by the Provisional Regulations on the Management of Financial Trust Investment Institutions promulgated in 
April 1986 and the Provisional Regulations on the Capital Management of Financial Trust Investment 
Institutions promulgated in December 1986. 
16 See L. Ho, Trust Law in China (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 2003) 2. ‘First, there is much hope in 
China that the Law will put in place an important legal instrument for the professional management of assets 
and, ultimately, for modernising China’s financial infrastructure. Second, the Chinese experiment might be 
useful to civil law jurisdictions generally as an illustration of how thorny issues regarding the reception of the 
common law trust can be tackled…’. 
17 See P. Jiang, Several Ideas of China’s Trust Law (Beijing: China Legal Publishing House, 2000) [translated by 
author]. 
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provides that: ‘the settlor, based on his faith in the trustee, entrusts his property rights to the 
trustee and allows the trustee to, according to the will of the settlor and in the name of the 
trustee, administer or dispose of such property in the interest of a beneficiary or for any 
intended purposes.’18 In the drafters’ perspective, the choice of the term ‘entrust’, as opposed 
to ‘transfer’, was not an oversight. The Trust Law of China only needed to provide that a trustee 
is authorised to manage and administer trust properties, and draw an adequate balance between 
the need to grant trustees the right to dispose of trust property and to protect beneficiaries’ 
rights. Moreover, because most of the trusts established in China aim to be collective 
investment schemes, the investors would transfer their investment to the trustees anyway.  
Therefore the drafters might not have thought it necessary to state that the ownership of trust 
property had to be transferred to the trustees. 
     Although specific rights of the beneficiary are regulated in various provisions (articles 43-
49), there is no explicit provision in the Trust Law of China that stipulates the nature of the 
beneficiary’s interests. It does not indicate whether the right to claim against the trustees and 
the right to exclude interference from third parties are in the nature of real rights or personal 
claims. Moreover, apart from the right to receive distributions, the beneficiary’s entitlements 
to monitor the trustee and bring actions for breach are granted by way of duplication of the 
settlor’s rights. Those unique regulations of the settlor’s rights imply that most Chinese trusts 
are ‘bare trusts’: the investment trusts that are prevalent in China are ones in which investors 
are both settlors and beneficiaries.19 However, when the settlor is not the sole beneficiary, 
granting the same rights to both settlors and beneficiaries, or more specifically, retaining the 
beneficiary’s rights as to settlors, as regulated in article 49, will cause conflicts between those 
 
18 Trust Law of China, n 15 above, art. 2. All translations of Chinese legislation are by the author. 
19 L. Gao, The Misunderstood Trust: Principles on Trust Law (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2010) 267 
[translated by author]. 
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two parties. Although these conflicts can be solved by the court, the efficiency of the trust’s 
management will be decreased. This is also a problem in many offshore jurisdictions where 
settlors are increasingly give more powers to retain control over trust property and distribution 
of trust property. For those reasons, the research of this article is significant: it does not only 
advise on the legal reform of Chinese law, but also provide a developed understanding of the 
beneficiary’s interests that is widely applicable outside China.   
 
THE ESSENCE OF TRUSTS 
 
To provide a developed understanding of the beneficiary’s interests in commercial trusts, 
which could respond to the evolved needs for commercial uses and also maintain the 
fundamental rule of the trust as a separate mechanism, the question that needs to be answered 
is which aspects of trust law relating to property and obligations are essential to a trust? The 
essence of trusts, i.e. a split between management and enjoyment of trust property, gives life 
to commercial uses of trusts.  
     A trust depends upon properly elaborating the various personal and proprietary rights, 
powers and duties that make up this relationship. The essence of the common law trust is the 
imposition of an equitable obligation on a trustee requiring the trustee to act in good faith when 
dealing with trust property in favour of the beneficiary. The beneficiaries have no direct control 
over the trust property. Thus the realization of their rights depends upon trustee’s performance. 
This means that the beneficiaries’ rights are the converse of the obligations of the trustee owed 
to them in respect of the trust property. The focus of the trust is on property. There will be no 
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equitable proprietary remedy available where the property at issue is unidentified or where that 
property has disappeared leaving no traceable substitute.20  
     In a sense the whole point of the trust is to separate the benefit of property from the right to 
exercise the powers that go with having legal title. The essence of the traditional common law 
trust is not in the separation of legal titles ⎯ a trustee’s legal ownership of the assets of the 
trust and a beneficiary’s equitable title to those same assets ⎯ but is ‘a split between 
management/administration and benefit/enjoyment’.21 The idea of separate funds and a split 
between administration and enjoyment is not confined to common law systems. It has also been 
admitted by other legal systems. Indeed, ‘there is a much greater acceptance of the idea in 
modern civil law that the owner of an asset may hold it for the benefit of others rather than for 
his own.’22  
     The common law concept of dual ownership is not the essence of trusts, and it does not 
prevent the introduction of trusts in civil law or the worldwide development of trusts for 
commercial purposes, also because the definition of ownership in common law and civil law 
is different. As Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld put it, the difference in terminology used to study 
the trust is misleading, as the language used to discuss the law of trusts in both the civil and 
common law system is so disparate as to be misleading.23 Additionally, Frederic William 
 
20 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] UKHL 12. The only exception to this rule is 
the constructive trust imposing personal liability to account for dishonest assistance in a breach of trust. 
21 T. Honoré, ‘Trusts: The Inessentials’ in J. Getzler and E.H. Burn (eds), Rationalizing Property, Equity, and 
Trusts: Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (London: LexisNexis UK, 2003) 1, 11. 
22 P. Matthews, ‘The Compatibility of the Trust with the Civil Law Notion of Property’ in L. Smith (ed), The 
Worlds of the Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 313, 338. 
23 W. N. Hohfeld, ‘Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 710, 
718. 
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Maitland holds that some of the basic terminology of trust law, such as ownership, almost 
carries unexpected meaning, which tends to deviate from its strict definition.24 As a result, the 
argument, which is based on the misunderstanding of the essence of trusts, that a civil law trust 
or commercial trust is not a “real” trust is a mistake.  
     In Chinese law, ownership is both perpetual and exclusive. It comprises four kinds of rights: 
rights of possession, use, beneficial enjoyment, and disposal of property.25 Article 39 of the 
Property Law of the People’s Republic of China26 (Property Law of China) stipulates that ‘[t]he 
owner of a real property or chattel is entitled to possess, utilise, seek profits from and dispose 
of the realty or chattel in accordance with law.’27 In contrast to the civilian model of ownership 
however, ‘[t]he old common law never thought in terms of absolute ownership’28, and people 
do not own things (a physical approach), they own rights in things (a metaphysical approach). 
Ownership tends to be a practical gathering together of uses and entitlements over the property 
under common law. 
     To clarify the different terminology of ownership also helps to provide a theoretical basis 
for the case study of Chinese law, or any comparative studies, because different meanings of 
 
24 F. W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1936) 23. 
25 This follows in the same tradition as the French theory, the most well-known model for a civil law system in 
modern times. See Code Napoléon (1804), ownership includes a complete power of three types of rights over 
the thing: usus – the right to use the thing, fructus – the right to take its fruits, and abusus – the right to destroy 
or alienate it. 
26 Property Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Fifth Session of the Tenth National People’s 
Congress, promulgated by Order No. 62 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 16 March 2007, 
and effective as of 1 October 2007). 
27 ibid, art. 39. 
28 D. W. M. Waters, M. Gillen and L. Smith, Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 4th ed, 2012) 
10. 
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ownership lead to differences in the rights and obligations of trust parties. The true meaning of 
terminology should be interpreted based on a review of its context and function.  
 
THE NATURE OF THE BENEFICIARY’S RIGHT 
 
After examining the essence of trusts, addressing misunderstandings relating to civil law trusts 
and commercial trusts, and clarifying the theoretical basis for the research, i.e. the difference 
in terminology of ownership, the real question now is how to interpret the nature of the 
beneficiary’s right in order to facilitate the evolved role of trusts in commercial activity. 
     There are various academic theories about the beneficiary’s rights. Taking China as an 
example, in 1987, He Xiaoyuan suggested that the ownership of trust property be transferred 
to a trustee, while a beneficiary has the right to revoke the trustee’s disposition of trust property 
in breach of trust purpose and a right to follow the trust property.29 Xie Zaiquan considered the 
trustee’s right as a limited real right, i.e. a real right on the property of other people and for 
their interests.30 On the other hand, Wen Shiyang proposed a different explanation in 2005. He 
stated that beneficiary’s equitable right is a genuine ownership; trustees’ ownership is only a 
right of administration.31 As early as in 1994, Jiang Ping raised the dual attributes of real rights 
and personal claims. He indicated that the trustee’s right to administer the trust property in his 
 
29 X. He, ‘Studies of Trust Law’ (1987) 1 Chung Hsing Law Review 1, 6 [translated by author]. The right to revoke 
trustees’ disposal of trust property and the right to follow the trust property are the two sides of the same kind 
of right. 
30 Z. Xie, Real Rights in Civil Law (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1999) 165 
[translated by author]. 
31 S. Wen and X. Feng, ‘Ownership of Trust Property: On the Improvement of China’s Legislation’ (2005) 2 
Wuhan University Journal 203, 206 [translated by author]. 
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own name is in the nature of real right, but his obligation to distribute the trust income is a 
personal claim.32 In addition, Zhou Xiaoming in 199633 and Li Qunxing in 200034 raised the 
argument of a new type of right or right combination.  
     The author argues that, to better fulfil the function of a trust, especially its commercial 
aspect, the trust is better understood as a binary system of real rights and personal claims, where 
the trustee is entitled to a prima facie ownership that is limited to the right to control and 
administer the trust property (although settlors may retain the ownership), and the beneficiary 
holds a right in the nature of ‘a special personal claim’. 
     The trustee’s ownership is claimed to be ‘a prima facie ownership’ because the trustees 
cannot obtain benefits arising from trust assets. Moreover, the trustee cannot arbitrarily dispose 
of trust property. This can be demonstrated in several ways: unlike a real owner, the trustees 
cannot freely abandon trust property but have duties to safeguard the trust property and exercise 
reasonable care over it, they have no right to put up trust property as collateral on their own 
personal obligation and they are not liable for any accidental losses of the trust property, or for 
costs awarded to a third party in an action against the trustees as legal owners of the trust 
property.35 Those differences between a trustee’s ownership and real ownership are due to the 
fact that the real purpose of the trust is not to give the trust property to the trustees as a gift, but 
simply to authorise them to manage and administer the trust property for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries or a specified purpose. Therefore, obligations, especially fiduciary duties, are 
 
32 Jiang, n 17 above, 59 [translated by author]. 
33 X. Zhou, Comparative Studies of Trust Law (Beijing: Law Press, 1996) 210 [translated by author]. 
34 Q. Li, ‘The Legal Nature and Basic Principles of Trust’ (2000) 3 Chinese Journal of Law 118, 121 [translated 
by author]. 
35 See Benett v Wyndham (1862) De GF & J 259; Re Raybould, [1900] Ch 199. 
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imposed on the trustees so as to ensure that they exercise their unitary ownership for the 
interests of beneficiaries or for the fulfilment of a certain purpose. 
     The nature of beneficiary’s interest is argued to be a special personal claim. To support this 
position, the author starts out with explaining why the beneficiary’s right should not be 
characterized as a real right, and then analyses how the beneficiary’s right should be 
conceptualized. Last but not least, she explains why ‘a special personal claim’ is a relatively 
unified understanding of the beneficiary’s interest, in particular in commercial context. 
 
Problems with theories that the beneficiary has a real right 
 
Firstly, it is worth nothing that a trustee is the person who should be granted exclusive powers 
of management over the trust assets in order for a trust to function. Therefore, even if the 
ownership of trust property were granted to beneficiaries, the right of management would still 
be conferred on the trustees.  
     If the beneficiary, but not the trustee, were the owner of the trust property, there would be 
a number of weaknesses: it would be hard to explain why the trustee can transfer good title to 
a third party because it violates the principle of nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam 
ipse haberet (nobody can confer a greater right on another than he has to give), which precludes 
the non-owner trustee from transferring title to the trust property. Furthermore, if the 
beneficiary’s real right theory were to prevail, the ownership of trust property would be in legal 
limbo for a certain period in some cases, such as the charitable trust, private purpose trust, and 
discretionary trust, that has no certain class of beneficiaries. For example, in the civil law case 
Royal Trust Co. v Tucker, primary beneficiaries did not exist when the deed of donation and 
the trust were made; consequently, for a certain period of time ownership of the property in the 
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trust would have been vested in no one.36 Last but not least, secrecy is deemed to be one 
advantage of the trust system. If the beneficiary’s right was considered as a real right, it should 
be registered and in that case the beneficiary’s identity would have to be revealed.  
     In China, the beneficiary’s real right theory faces a number of challenges. First, the 
beneficiary’s right does not satisfy the definition of real right (物权) in the Property Law of 
China. Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Property Law of China stipulates a real right as ‘the 
exclusive right of direct control over a specific thing in accordance with law, and includes 
(exhaustively) ownership, usufructuary rights, and security rights.’37 Nevertheless, the Trust 
Law of China grants the beneficiary no exclusive right to manage or control the trust property. 
Moreover, the beneficiary’s right cannot be viewed as a usufructuary right since a usufructuary 
right requires the possession of the relevant property.38 As noted, because in trusts it is the 
trustee rather than the beneficiary who holds the possession of trust property, this right would 
appear to be immediately precluded. In a similar vein, the beneficiary’s right is not a security 
right because a security right gives a secured creditor a priority over unsecured creditors in 
having his claim be paid with the trust property.39 However, the beneficiary has no priority 
against other trust creditors except for the personal creditors of a trustee due to the 
independence of trust assets.40 
     Furthermore, the beneficiary’s right cannot be attributed to any specific type of real rights. 
Pursuant to article 5 of the Property Law of China, ‘[t]he varieties and contents of real rights 
 
36 Royal Trust Co. v Tucker, 1982, SCC, 264-265. 
37 Property Law of China, n 26 above, art. 2. 
38 X. Sun, Property Law (Beijing: Law Press, 2008) 79 [translated by author]. 
39 Z. Wang, Principles of Personal Claims (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2009) 13 [translated by author]. 
40 D. Chen, Trust Law and the Innovation of Trust System in China (Shanghai: Lixin Accounting Publishing House, 
2003) 113 [translated by author]. 
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shall be prescribed by law.’41 Nevertheless, the beneficiary’s right is not expressly or implicitly 
regulated as a type of real right by the Trust Law of China or other legislation. In order to avoid 
recognizing the beneficiary’s right as a right directly enforceable against trust property, the 
Trust Law of China stipulates that the legal bases of the enforcement of the beneficiary’s rights 
are the trust documents but not the legislation itself.42 Moreover, although article 5 of the 
Property Law of China does not prevent legislation from creating new types of real rights, it is 
still difficult to classify the beneficiary’s right as a real right because of the instability inherent 
in the nature of (typically fungible) trust property. While a real right requires stability of the 
property, the particular assets which make up the trust fund are liable to change from time to 
time dependent on the trustee’s management. For example, the trust fund could readily be 
converted from cash to securities depending on the trustee’s management decisions. 
Additionally, if the beneficiary’s right is viewed as a real right, it will result in assets held in 
charitable trusts becoming ownerless, as there is no beneficiary as such, but rather just a 
purpose for which the trust exists. Incidentally, charitable trusts exist in English law but they 
does not preclude the finding that the beneficiary has a proprietary interest. As a consequence, 
the beneficiary’s right cannot be defined as a real right. The Chinese trust law does not 
recognise it as a real right, at least not until the trust is terminated and the ownership is 
transferred to the beneficiary. 
     
The beneficiary’s right as a special personal claim 
 
 
41 Property Law of China, n 26 above, art. 5. 
42 Trust Law of China, n 15 above, art. 9: The following items shall be stated clearly in the written documents 
required for the creation of a trust:  (5) the form and means through which the beneficiary gains benefits from 
the trust. 
 16 
Compared with the above two theories, the main argument proposed in this article appears to 
be closer to the personal claim theory. It differs, however, in its assertion that the beneficiary’s 
right has a broader meaning as compared to a typical personal claim. First, the beneficiary’s 
rights are beyond the scope of personal claims, such as the right to supervise trust affairs. 
Furthermore, it is different from a typical personal claim that binds two parties in a creditor-
debtor relationship,43 a beneficiary’s right can affect a third party’s right in the trust property. 
Although the beneficiary’s claim is not directly against a third party, it can affect the third 
party’s rights in trust property by annulling trustee’s transfer of the property to the third party.  
     The special personal claim theory is different from the recent argument of common law 
scholars, which claims that equitable property rights are best understood as rights against rights, 
but not as property rights (rights against things) or as personal rights (rights against persons)44. 
Firstly, the notion of rights against rights, a type of right belonging to neither real rights nor 
personal claims, finds no place in the Chinese or maybe other civilian legal frameworks. More 
important, the broader meaning of personal claims in interpreting beneficiary’s interest under 
the special personal claim theory, nevertheless, does not prevent the beneficiary’s right from 
being characterised to a personal claim, as opposed to a real right. Although in general only 
real rights are exigible against third parties, secondary personal claims can arise against third 
parties who are guilty of interference in the performance of the trustee’s performance of their 
primary duties to the beneficiary. As Professor Smith argues ‘[t]his idea is not alien to the civil 
law, which also recognizes that while a personal obligation does not create a real right but only 
 
43 Z. Wang, Principles of Personal Claims (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2009) 15 [translated by author]. 
44 B. McFarlane and R. Stevens, ‘The Nature of Equitable Property’ (2010) 4(1) The Journal of Equity (2010) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1350437> accessed 31 December 2019. 
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a claim against a particular debtor, nonetheless it is possible that there might be claims in delict 
against third parties who wrongfully interfere in the performance of an obligation’.45    
     This article argues that the beneficiaries’ right to supervise trust affairs and annul a trustees’ 
wrongful disposal of trust property, both of which are beyond the narrow scope of personal 
claims, can be interpreted as the appurtenance and the preservation of the personal claims 
respectively. This is for the following reasons: 
     Firstly, jurists have interpreted the beneficiary’s right to supervise trust affairs as  
appurtenant to or incidental to their personal claims to enforce the trustee’s duties to distribute 
assets according to the trust terms.46 It is suggested that although the right of supervision 
directly falls into neither personal claims nor real rights, it is in essence derived from the 
beneficiary’s personal claims to ensure that the trustee carries out the terms of the trust. The 
reason to support this opinion is that the right of supervision must be transferred along with the 
transfer of beneficiaries’ personal claims. In the same fashion, once the beneficiaries waive 
their personal claims, the right of supervision must also be waived.47 From the perspective of 
its function and position therefore, the right of supervision is in a subordinate position, to 
support and realise the beneficiaries’ personal claims. Thus, the right to supervision is 
essentially an auxiliary and derivative right of the personal claims which are the beneficiary’s 
core rights. 
     Secondly, with regards to the beneficiary’s right to annul the trustee’s disposal of trust 
property against the trust purpose, the view advanced here that this right also exists to preserve 
 
45 L. Smith, ‘Trust and Patrimony’ (2009) 28 Estates, Trusts & Pensions Journal 332, 343. 
46 H. Yu, ‘China’s Reception of the Dual Ownership of Anglo-American Trust’ (2010) 3 Modern Law Science 159, 
164 [translated by author]. 
47 H. Yu, How to Localise the British and American Law on Trust Property in China (Beijing: China University 
of Political Science and Law Press, 2011) 111 [translated by author]. 
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the beneficiaries’ personal claims. This right comes from the nature of a creditor’s right to 
revoke, rather than a right of recovery based on real rights. 
     Taking Chinese law as an example, the beneficiary’s right of revocation is granted by 
articles 49 and 22 of the Trust Law of China. That is, where the trustee disposes of the trust 
property in breach of the purposes of the trust, or causes losses to the trust property due to his 
departure from his administrative duties or improper handling of trust business, the beneficiary 
shall have the right to apply to the People’s Court for annulling such disposition and the right 
to ask the trustee to restore the property to its former state or make compensation. Where a 
transferee of the said trust property accepts the property while knowing the violation of the 
purposes of the trust, he shall return the property or make compensation.48 
     These regulations present similarities between the right of revocation in trusts and the right 
of recovery under the real rights regime – ‘[w]here a realty or chattel is under an unauthorised 
possession, the right holder may require the returning of the original object’49. However, this 
ignores that the right of recovery in real rights is not the only analogue of the beneficiaries’ 
right of revocation, and real rights are not the only basis of the right of revocation.  
     In fact, the right to annul the trustee’s wrongful disposal can also be based on personal 
claims. Likewise, and pursuant to the right of revocation in personal claims, a creditor may 
also request the court to annul a debtor’s disposal of property or right when it jeopardises the 
realization of personal claims. As regulated in article 74 of the Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China50 (Contract Law of China): 
 
48 See Trust Law of China, n 15 above, art 22 and art 49 “The beneficiary may enjoy the rights of the settlor 
prescribed in Articles 20 to 23”. 
49 Property Law of China, n 26 above, art. 34. 
50 Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s 
Congress, promulgated by Order No. 15 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on 15 March 1999, 
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If a debtor disclaims its due creditor's rights or transfers gratis its property and thus causes 
losses to the creditor, the creditor may apply to a people's court to rescind the debtor's 
action. The creditor may also apply to a people's court to rescind the debtor's action if the 
debtor causes losses to the creditor by transferring its property at a low price evidently 
unreasonable and with awareness of the transferee. The scope for exercising the right of 
rescission is limited to the creditor's rights enjoyed by the creditor. The expenses required 
by the creditor in exercising its right of rescission shall be borne by the debtor.51 
 
It can be seen therefore the right of revocation is not necessarily based on real rights, but can 
also be exercised by a creditor exercising his personal claims when his interests are harmed by 
debtors. The condition of exercising a creditor’ right of revocation is when the creditor’ 
interests are harmed by debtors as a result of the debtors abandon their matured obligatory 
rights, transfer property without consideration, or transfer property at an unreasonable low 
price. This condition is similar to the circumstance under which a beneficiary can exercise his 
right of revocation, i.e. when the beneficiary’s interests are harmed by trustee’s improper 
management of trust that causes losses to the trust property. 
 
     This article argues that the beneficiary’s right of revocation is in the nature of a creditor’s 
revocation right but not a recovery of real rights. That is because, on the one hand, in contrast 
to the recovery of real rights of which the purpose is to resume the control of property,52 the 
right of revocation in the trust aims mainly at preserving the trust property instead of controlling 
 
and effective as of 1 October 1999). 
51 ibid, art. 74. 
52 L. Wang, Property Law Research (Beijing: China People’s University Press, 2007) 201. 
 20 
them. Even when the trust property is returned to the trust as a result of the beneficiary’s right 
of revocation, it reverts back to the control of the trustee53 while the beneficiary still has no 
power over the trust property. On the other hand, unlike the right of recovery, which is part of 
the real right, the beneficiary’s right to annul trustees’ act is not tied to real rights in the trust 
property. This power to annul is instead the same as the characteristic of a creditor’s right to 
annul. For example, when a trustee releases the debts that are held as trust property, the 
beneficiary’s right to annul this disposal can only be by a creditor’s right to annul for the reason 
that an application of the recovery of real rights requires the trustee to dispose of the trust 
property.54 By contrast, a creditor’s right to annul can be used to preserve the trust property.55 
As a result, it is more reasonable to characterise the beneficiary’s right to annul trustee’s 
disposal as a creditor’s right of revocation, rather than a right of recovery connected to real 
rights. 
     In sum therefore, this article makes a unique contribution and defines the beneficiary’s right 
as a special personal claim that consists three parts: the main claim (personal claims), 
appurtenant rights (rights of supervision), and security rights (rights of revocation). Working 
together with the basic rule of trusts − the independence of trust property that requires the trust 
assets to be separated from trustees’ personal assets, the beneficiary’s interest is secured in the 
event of the trustees’ bankruptcy or death. 
 
The theory of special personal claim provides a developed understanding of the 
beneficiary’s interest 
 
53 The innocent trustees or newly appointed trustees in case of bad faith dispositions by a trustee. 
54 ibid, 204. 
55 Wang, n 43 above, 190. 
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The ‘special personal claim’ provides a more unified and developed understanding of the 
beneficiary’s interest, because (a) it suits better in civil law systems comparing with the theory 
of rights against rights, and (b) it is applicable to both traditional family trusts and modern 
commercial trusts. The ‘special personal claim’ causes no fundamental change to neither the 
basic rule of trusts nor civil law framework.  
     As discussed above, the recent common law theory of rights against rights is hard to fit into 
civil law systems, because it proposes a type of right belonging to neither real rights nor 
personal claims. In contrast, the ‘special personal claim’, which does not prevent the 
beneficiary’s right from being characterised to a personal claim, is more suitable into civilian 
jurisdictions.  
     Furthermore, compared to the traditional common law argument of equitable rights, which 
may be both personal and proprietary, the ‘special personal claim’ provides a more developed 
and unified understanding of the beneficiary’s interest that is applicable to both traditional 
family trusts and the use of trusts in commercial applications. 
     Under common law, a broadly accepted theory of the nature of a beneficiary’s right holds 
that a beneficiary has a variety of equitable rights arising from the trust, which may be both 
personal and proprietary. That is, a beneficiary’s rights can be predicated both on his or her 
personal rights against the trustees and on any proprietary interests in an external relationship 
with a third party.56 By this reading, a beneficiary may bring proceedings in personam against 
trustees for a breach of trust; however, such a claim may be subject to time limits imposed by 
a limitation statute.57 Moreover, a proprietary right may be instituted against the trustees to 
 
56 P. S. Davies and G. Virgo, Equity & Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2016) 485. 
57 For example, see Limitation Act 1980 (c.58), s. 21 Time limit for actions in respect of trust property, para (3) 
‘an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for 
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recover (trace) the trust property.58 As Professor Smith notes, ‘[t]he rights of beneficiaries in 
the common law trust are neither purely personal rights against the trustee, nor are they real 
rights in the trust property, but rather they are rights over the rights which the trustee holds as 
trust property; they have a proprietary character since they persist against many third party 
transferees of the trust property.’ 59  Specifically, a beneficiary’s proprietary rights under 
common law were recognised by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank 
Girozentrale v Islington LBC.60 The beneficiary has a proprietary interest in the trust property, 
which is, in equity, enforceable against any subsequent holder of the property other than a 
purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice. Noland makes a classic statement on 
the nature of a beneficiary’s proprietary rights: ‘The key proprietary features of a beneficiary’s 
interest under a trust are his primary negative right to exclude non-beneficiaries from 
enjoyment of trust assets and secondary rights to vindicate that primary right if it is infringed.’61  
     While maintaining the fundamental rule of common law, the theory of a beneficiary’s 
special personal claim is more developed than the traditional common law argument of 
equitable rights, which may be both personal and proprietary. This is because the ‘special 
personal claim’ theory provides a simple, unified restatement of the beneficiary’s interests that 
applies to different types of trusts, both fixed and discretionary. In contrast, traditional common 
law analysis perceives the nature of a beneficiary’s rights as dependent on the type of trust.62 
 
which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Act, shall not be brought after the 
expiration of six years from the date on which the right of action accrued’. 
58 M. Ramjoin, Text, Cases and Materials on Equity and Trusts (Oxon: Routledge Cavendish, 4th ed, 2008) 539. 
59 L. Smith, ‘Trust and Patrimony’ (2009) 28 Estates, Trusts and Pensions Journal 332, 332. 
60 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] AC 669, 705. 
61 R. Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 232, 236. 
62 Davies and Virgo, n 56 above, 485. 
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The proprietary right is recognised in fixed trusts but not in a discretionary trust. In Gartside v 
IRC,63 Lord Wilberforce made clear that the object of a discretionary trust, a trust under which 
the trustee has the discretion to select for distribution amongst members, does not have a 
proprietary right to trust property. Since ‘[o]ne consequence of the beneficiary having a 
proprietary interest in the trust property is that, if the trustee becomes insolvent, the property 
will not be available to the trustee’s creditors’64, the common law theory of personal and 
proprietary rights seems to suggest that a beneficiary cannot be protected from the claims of a 
trustee’s personal creditors in a discretionary trust. This notion conflicts with the essence of 
trusts: that trust assets are independent from trustees’ personal property. Furthermore, 
according to the common law proprietary theory, the beneficiary in a discretionary trust is 
unable to recover trust property when the property is misappropriated by the trustee and 
transferred to a party, which is another consequence of bringing a proprietary claim. Therefore, 
when comparing with the common law theory of personal and proprietary right, the theory of 
special personal claim provides more comprehensive protection to beneficiaries, which is 
beyond the limits of the consequences of a proprietary claim. 
     A universal restatement of the nature of a beneficiary’s interests not only resolves any 
discrepancy in applying the law to different types of trusts, but also corresponds to the 
development of trust in a commercial context. Commercial dealings have significantly 
influenced the beneficiary’s rights. 65  Influences drive the development of the law. First, 
 
63 Gartside v IRC [1968] AC 553, 617. 
64 Davies and Virgo, n 56 above, 487. 
65 Commercial dealings have significantly influenced the beneficiary’s rights in relation to both the proprietary 
tracing action and equity’s personal actions for knowing receipt and dishonest assistance. See Wilson, n Error! 
Bookmark not defined. above, 450 and 452. ‘The so-called commercial swap agreements from the 1990s 
involving public authorities have been enormously influential in shaping the nature of the proprietary tracing 
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nowadays virtually all of the litigation surrounding the proprietary tracing claim and the 
‘knowing’ stranger personal actions, are ones where parties are in a contractual relationship 
and at least one of the parties is a commercial actor, such as in Halifax BS v Thomas66. It is also 
the case that beneficiary’s actions commonly involve those who have been victims of fraud or 
theft, even outside of the context of a contractual relationship.67 In both cases, whether a 
contractual relationship or a tort, personal claims have been used as the main remedies. Thus, 
the theory of special personal claim provides a consistent understanding of a beneficiary’s 
rights in commercial trusts. Furthermore, as envisaged by some of the key common law 
advocates themselves, commercial cases would seek to accommodate the proprietary 
entitlement of owners in law and in equity alike, and allow the simplicity of the common law’s 
approaches, namely, Lord Millett’s envisioned unified set of tracing rules. What has 
encouraged this has been the huge volume of commercial fiduciary litigation that has continued 
to simultaneously affirm and question the requirement for a universal set of tracing rules.68 The 
 
claim for the twenty-first century. A number of cases − famously, Westdeutsche, but also Guinness Mahon & 
Co. v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC [1998] 2 All ER 272 and earlier Hazell v Hammersmith [1991] 2 WLR 
372 − became the battleground for competing views on proprietary entitlement and restitution.’ With respect to 
the liability for knowing receipt, the significance of the commercial dealings has been crucial in the difficulties 
experienced in establishing the standard for liability to arise. ‘Indeed as a number of cases prior to BCCI 
(Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [2000] 3 WLR 1423 demonstrate, it is the speed of commercial transactions that is 
seen as being responsible for difficulties in determining what degree of knowledge under Baden Delvaux [1983] 
BCLC 325 was required for liability to arise, and it is another commercial context case that ensures that 
Starglade provides the most current statement on the law relating to knowing receipt.’ 
66 Halifax BS v Thomas [1996] Ch 217. 
67 S. Wilson, Todd & Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts & Equity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12th ed, 2015) 451. 
68 See ibid, 452. 
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theory of special personal claim just conforms to the envisioned universal, simplified rule, and 
provides a solution for it.  
     Last but not least, the theory of a beneficiary’s special personal claim can be drawn from a 
case study of the Chinese law of a civilian jurisdiction, and fits well into the civil law property 
system where ownership is absolute. There is a long-standing historical debate on the nature of 
a beneficiary’s rights, and it is particularly concerned with the application of the civil law 
notion of ownership − rights in rem and rights in personam to the English law of property − 
where it is ill-fitting.69 The theory of a beneficiary’s special personal claim overcomes such 
difficulty, and provides a developed understanding of the beneficiary’s interests that not only 
provides a response to the evolution of trust for commercial uses, but also broadly applies in a 
worldwide context, where the concept of equitable ownership does not apply. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the modern world, trusts have developed to be more often used as a valuable device for 
commercial applications. Because of the trust’s advantages in investment, banking, financing 
and property management, China, like other civilian jurisdictions, took the bold step of 
introducing the trust into domestic law. The evolution of trusts and their introduction in civil 
law requires a developed understanding and new judicial interpretations of the beneficiary’s 
interests.  
     Through a comparative study of Chinese trusts − an example of trusts in civil law and for 
commercial uses − this article provides a developed, unified understanding of the beneficiary’s 
interest in modern trusts. The author argues that the beneficiary’s rights can be explained as 
 
69 J. E. Penner, The Law of Trusts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2019) 53. 
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personal claims, as opposed to real rights, yet they are special because beneficiaries have some 
rights beyond the traditional scope of personal claims. The special personal claim consists of 
three parts: the main claim (personal claims), appurtenant rights (rights of supervision), and 
security rights (rights of revocation).  
     It is hoped that this article will give rise to a reassessment of the traditional theory of the 
beneficiary’s interest. 
 
